Résultats de recherche pour Kapitalstruktur

Das Kapitalband

The revision of the Swiss law on companies limited by shares, which came into force on January 1, 2023, introduced the capital band («Kapitalband»). This new legal institution leads to more flexibility for the companies with regard to equity financing by giving the shareholders the possibility to authorize the board of directors to increase and decrease the share capital without a prior…

Das Kapitalband im neuen Aktienrecht

On June 19, 2020, the National Council and the Council of States adopted the revision of the Swiss law on companies limited by shares. This article deals with the capital band («Kapitalband») that introduces the possibility for shareholders to authorize the board of directors to increase and reduce the share capital without previous resolution by the general meeting. In line with an…

Was ist «wirtschafts-verträgliches» Aktienrecht?

The last comprehensive overhaul of Swiss corporation law dates from 1991. The revised law was intended to provide more transparency, improve shareholder rights and set goalposts with respect to corporate organization and corporate powers. But the 1991 corporation law fell short of international standards, especially for listed companies. Numerous pieces of legislation and self-regulatory…

Pflichten des Verwaltungsrats einer möglichen Zielgesellschaft

Even though the shareholders are the addressees of a takeover bid, the sale process of a listed target company is largely determined by the target’s board of directors: The board of directors is responsible for the negotiations prior to the publication of a takeover bid and can often influence by its actions whether a (possibly un­friendly) takeover bid will occur. Of decisive importance for the…

Das Aktienkapital im Entwurf zur Aktienrechtsrevision

On November 23, 2016, the Federal Council published its proposal for a revised law on companies limited by shares. This article deals with the share capital, one of the key aspects of the proposed revision. First, it addresses the specific characteristic of Swiss law, according to which shares have a nominal value. Second, the article analyzes how the procedures of capital changes are regulated in…

Kernfragen der Aktienrechtsrevision

On November 23, 2016, the Federal Council published its proposal for a revised law on companies limited by shares. This article deals with four key aspects of the proposed revision. First, it addresses the proposed amendments regar­ding the capital structure. The authors thereby focus on the rules for capital increases, decreases and the possibility to introduce a so called «capital band». Secon…

Risiken bei systemrelevanten Institutionen: wirtschaftspolitische Analyse am Beispiel der Schweiz

The financial crisis has demonstrated the enormous economic costs of the failure of systemically relevant financial institutions. The size and interconnectedness of such institutions creates external effects and the fact that governments are de facto forced to prevent their bankruptcy creates moral hazard. In both cases econo­mic theory clearly suggest that the regulatory framework should aim at…

Ist Art. 42a Abs. 4–6 FINMAG (Einschränkung des Kundenverfahrens im Rahmen der internationalen Finanzmarkt-Amtshilfe) verfassungskonform?

More or less unnoticed from the general Swiss population the Swiss legal provisions concerning international administrative assistance in stock market supervision underwent certain revisions that entered into effect on 1 January 2016. Particularly, in contrast to the old rules the Swiss financial markets supervisory authority FINMA now has the possibility, exceptionally, to transmit information…

Wer kontrolliert die Aktiengesellschaft?

In Switzerland as in other countries, there is a perennial debate relating to the question of who controls a listed company, and whose interests a corporation should serve: the largest shareholders, minority shareholders, or other stakeholders? And what is the influence of management or the recent phenomenon of proxy advisors on decision-making in listed companies? The author analyzes the issues…

Rechenschaft und Transparenz als zentraler Teil der Governance oder als Selbstzweck?

The title of the essay is: “Accountability and Transparency as a function of governance or a function which ends in themselves?” Without transparency good corporate governance is not possible, since only informed decisions are dutiful decisions. Both, the general assembly of shareholders and the board must make decisions which are only possible if transparency is given. For example, for most…